Give Soft Power a Chance

While Ethiopia’s quest for sea access is economically and strategically justified, its reliance on confrontational rhetoric and unpredictable hard-power maneuvers risks alienating neighbors, destabilizing the Horn of Africa, and threatening to make Addis Ababa diplomatically vulnerable.

Instead of coercion, Ethiopia should prioritize soft power—leveraging its historic diplomatic influence, economic partnerships, and infrastructure investments—to negotiate sustainable port agreements, enhance regional trust, and achieve its goals through integration rather than confrontation.

Maritime Tension

The maritime ambition was publicly declared by Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed two years ago and reiterated recently during a parliamentary session, where he emphasized that Ethiopia’s proximity to the Red Sea makes it unacceptable not to “dream of touching it.”

Ethiopia’s brief shift in focus to Somalia, through a controversial Memorandum of Understanding signed with Somaliland for access to the Gulf of Aden, triggered a diplomatic rift with Mogadishu and led to increased Egyptian military involvement in Somalia.

However, as Ethiopia and Somalia moved to normalize relations—highlighted by the Ankara Declaration—the focus appeared to return to the Eritrean coastline, particularly Assab port.

The issue is further complicated by Ethiopia’s exclusion from the Saudi-led Red Sea Forum and its apparent determination to integrate into the region’s maritime security architecture. This determination was underlined by Ethiopia’s military chief, Field Marshal Birhanu Jula, who recently asserted that it was “a matter of time” before Ethiopia becomes part of the Red Sea community.

Ethiopia’s next steps along a troubled road to democracy – Ethiopia Insight

Pluralism remains officially stifled

Meanwhile, Eritrea has been strengthening its ties with Egypt and Sudan, two countries also wary of Ethiopia’s ambitions. Eritrea’s recent diplomatic overtures—including a visit to Cairo, hosting Sudan’s General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, and Egyptian President El-Sisi’s recent trip to Djibouti—suggest an emerging alignment that could encircle and isolate Ethiopia diplomatically.

Coupled with lingering tensions between the federal government and the TPLF, as well as alleged ties between Eritrea, TPLF elements, and armed actors in Amhara, the Horn of Africa remains fragile and at risk of deeper regional destabilization.

Wasted Leverage

Ethiopia’s historical mismanagement of its relationship with Eritrea—marked by coercion over consensus—represents a long-standing failure to exercise soft power at critical junctures. In 1952, Eritrea was federated with Ethiopia under a United Nations resolution following British control of the territory after World War II.

However, instead of nurturing this federal arrangement through dialogue and mutual benefit, Emperor Haile Selassie unilaterally dismantled it in 1962, annexing Eritrea and denying it autonomous governance. This heavy-handed move, lacking popular support or diplomatic finesse, ignited a 30-year armed struggle that ultimately resulted in Eritrea’s secession in 1991, formalized by a 1993 referendum.

This missed opportunity for peaceful integration through persuasion and institutional respect cost Ethiopia not only a unified future with Eritrea but also its access to the Red Sea. Analysts have pointed out that the Ethiopian government under the EPRDF failed to deploy legal, diplomatic, or multilateral mechanisms to negotiate continued access to Assab—a strategically vital port—during Eritrea’s independence process.

Instead, relations were governed more by historical grievance and short-term tactical alliances than by a long-term, soft-power strategy rooted in mutual interest and trust.

Further complicating matters, Ethiopia failed to challenge the legitimacy of colonial-era boundaries that were used to justify Eritrea’s post-independence control of Assab. Italy’s 1935 invasion of Ethiopia—a clear breach of international law—effectively nullified the legal and moral basis of earlier colonial agreements with Menelik II.

Yet, Ethiopia did little to build a case on these grounds in international forums, ceding ground to a narrative shaped by colonial cartography rather than post-colonial justice.

Once again, the lack of principled state-to-state relations, and the absence of enduring institutional frameworks, turned opportunity into hostility. Today, the failure to resolve the status of Assab and normalize relations with Eritrea reflects Ethiopia’s deeper inability to consistently deploy soft power—diplomacy, legal strategy, and cooperative frameworks—in dealing with its most sensitive geopolitical challenges.

As tensions reemerge, the consequences of this strategic vacuum remain painfully evident.

Soft Power Gap

Joseph Nye’s concept of soft power—the ability of a country to shape the preferences and actions of others through attraction and persuasion rather than coercion—offers vital insights into Ethiopia’s foreign policy challenges.

Soft power is rooted in a country’s culture, political values, and foreign policies when these are seen as legitimate or having moral authority. For a regional heavyweight like Ethiopia, whose geographic position and population size naturally project influence, the strategic deployment of soft power has always held great promise.

Under the EPRDF, Ethiopia made significant strides in enhancing its international standing. From 2004 to 2018, Ethiopia’s double-digit economic growth attracted investment and favorable media coverage, turning it into an African success story. Mega infrastructure projects, including power generation and road networks, boosted its regional influence.

Ethiopia’s leading role in peacekeeping missions, particularly in South Sudan, Sudan, and Somalia, positioned it as a reliable peace broker.

Landmark initiatives like LAPSSET (Lamu Port–South Sudan–Ethiopia Transport Corridor) illustrated the country’s ambition to serve as an economic engine for East Africa. During this era, Ethiopia was considered an anchor state, regularly representing Africa on international platforms.

However, these successes sharply contrasted with EPRDF’s approach to Eritrea. Rather than exercising its growing soft power to foster durable peace, the government pursued a strategy of isolation. After the 1998-2000 border war, Ethiopia refused to fully implement the Algiers Agreement and the ruling of the Ethiopia-Eritrea Boundary Commission, missing a critical opportunity for reconciliation.

Instead of leveraging its diplomatic capital to strike a mutually beneficial deal—especially around shared economic interests like Assab port—Ethiopia doubled down on marginalizing Eritrea internationally. While this brought short-term geopolitical advantage, it seeded long-term animosity.

That said, it is worth probing whether the lack of progress on economic integration was due purely to Ethiopian “neglect” or a deeper strategic impasse. Eritrea’s political culture has long shown hostility to integration, often choosing isolation as a means of regime consolidation. Even during the peak of the Abiy-Isaias rapprochement, Eritrea closed border crossings at Zalambessa, seemingly unsettled by the grassroots enthusiasm for normalization.

Mutually beneficial projects akin to LAPSSET may have been untenable not solely due to Ethiopian inertia, but also because Asmara feared that economic openness might undermine its centralized grip on power.

Strategic Drift

Prime Minister Abiy inherited a region primed for diplomacy but quickly eroded Ethiopia’s soft power edge.

While he took bold and sometimes transactional foreign policy decisions—such as accepting the Algiers Agreement to woo Eritrea, tolerance over Sudanese’ annexation of Al-Fashaga lands presumably to avert its meddling in Tigray war, or trading recognition for port access in the Somaliland MoU—these moves often lacked strategic follow-through and domestic legitimacy.

His administration’s approach has become increasingly personalized, opaque, and improvisational. The celebrated 2018 détente with Eritrea was never institutionalized. Its unraveling exposed the limits of diplomacy based on elite bargains rather than shared national interests.

Furthermore, Ethiopia’s resort to hard power—most tragically in the Tigray war, and later in Amhara and Oromia—and continued human rights violations undermined both its internal cohesion and moral credibility abroad. Its once-lauded role as a regional stabilizer has diminished; Sudan’s rejection of Ethiopian peacekeepers from Abyei symbolized this shift.

In diplomatic engagement over Red Sea access, the government has relied more on nationalist rhetoric and media posturing than principled negotiation. Despite a reported plan to connect Assab to Semera, and gestures toward economic collaboration, no durable framework emerged.

Abiy’s foreign policy, while occasionally pragmatic, often appeared unanchored from long-term strategic objectives, and failed to convert short-term leverage into enduring influence.

Reclaiming Momentum

For Ethiopia to achieve reliable sea access and secure regional peace, it must return to the principles of soft power: persuasion, mutual respect, and shared interests. The government must treat Eritrea as a sovereign partner, engage in transparent diplomacy, and foster economic integration projects similar to LAPSSET in the north.

Joining or revitalizing regional bodies like the East African Community and expanding cross-border infrastructure could turn neighbors into stakeholders in Ethiopia’s prosperity.

Crucially, Eritrea’s isolationist posture and suspicion of regional interdependence must also be addressed—not as a justification for Ethiopia’s failures, but as a real constraint on diplomatic imagination. Ethiopia cannot carry the burden of normalization alone, but it can position itself as the side that consistently offers constructive and principled overtures.

Domestically, restoring democratic governance and protecting civic freedoms are non-negotiable foundations for sustainable foreign policy. Only a state that commands internal legitimacy can project persuasive power abroad. In Nye’s terms, Ethiopia must make itself attractive again—not only to Eritrea but to the region and the world.

Only then can Ethiopia truly realize its potential as a prosperous and independent nation.