Africa File, October 17, 2024: Egypt-Eritrea-Somalia Summit; Challenges with Tigray Peace Process

Authors: Kathryn Tyson and Liam Karr

Data Cutoff: October 17, 2024, at 10 a.m.

Editor's Note: The Critical Threats Project at the American Enterprise Institute publishes these updates with support from the Institute for the Study of War.

The Africa File provides regular analysis and assessments of major developments regarding state and nonstate actors’ activities in Africa that undermine regional stability and threaten US personnel and interests.

Key Takeaways:

• Somalia: The presidents of Egypt, Eritrea, and Somalia formalized and deepened an anti-Ethiopian alliance during a trilateral summit on October 10. The summit is part of a framework that Egypt, Eritrea, and Somalia are developing to counter Ethiopia if it follows through on its port deal with Somaliland.
• Ethiopia: The head of the Tigray People’s Liberation Front removed the head of the Tigray interim administration on October 7, signaling a worsening legitimacy crisis in the Tigray region. The legitimacy disputes represent another challenge in implementing the 2022 Pretoria peace agreement, which ended the Tigray war.

Somalia:

The presidents of Egypt, Eritrea, and Somalia formalized and deepened an anti-Ethiopian alliance during a trilateral summit on October 10. Egyptian President Abdel Fatah al Sisi, Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki, and Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud met in Asmara, Eritrea, to bolster ties and coordinate regional security.[1] The presidents addressed “a wide range of regional and international issues.” They agreed to strengthen Somali state institutions and the Somali National Army to “confront various internal and external challenges,” according to a joint statement.[2]

Somalia has worked to deepen diplomatic relations and security cooperation with Eritrea and Egypt since Ethiopia signed a naval port deal with Somaliland. The January 2024 deal granted Ethiopia land in Somaliland for a naval base in return for recognizing Somaliland’s independence.[3] The Somali Federal Government has strongly rejected the deal as unlawful and a violation of its territorial integrity, as it considers Somaliland to be part of its territory.[4] The Somali and Eritrean presidents met days after the port deal announcement to discuss ways to “strengthen ties and foster cooperation.”[5] Somali media said the two-day visit was “impromptu,” suggesting it was in response to the deal.[6] Somalia’s cooperation with Egypt in particular has accelerated since January 2024. Egypt and Somalia signed a bilateral defense cooperation agreement in Cairo in August.[7] Egyptian media said Egypt deployed 1,000 soldiers to Mogadishu between August 27 and 29, while international media has reported on two arms shipments including ammunition, arms, artillery, and other weaponry since August.[8]

Figure 1. Egypt, Eritrea, and Somalia Form an Anti-Ethiopia Axis

Source: Liam Karr.

Egypt and Eritrea have long-standing concerns with Ethiopia, and the summit with Somalia is an opportunity for Egypt and Eritrea to address these concerns. The three countries highlighted their discussions on security cooperation in the Red Sea and Bab al Mandab Strait and acknowledged the “critical importance” of these maritime routes. Egypt and Eritrea have both been at odds with Ethiopia over access to the Red Sea. Egypt wants to deny Ethiopia Red Sea naval access so that Ethiopia cannot threaten Egypt’s Red Sea rents in the far future.[9] Eritrea and Ethiopia reportedly mobilized troops near their shared border in October 2023 after Ethiopian President Abiy Ahmed indirectly threatened to annex an Eritrean port on the Red Sea.[10]

Egypt has also been in conflict with Ethiopia over its Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) project since 2011.[11] Egypt has repeatedly labeled the GERD an existential threat that will degrade its Nile water supply, which is vital for Egypt’s economy and general population.[12]

Eritrea additionally wants to protect its borders from Ethiopian militias in the aftermath of the Tigray war. Eritrea allied with the Ethiopian government in 2020 to destroy the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), which it views as a threat to its borders and internal cohesion.[13] It views the 2022 peace deal that ended the Tigray war as dangerous to its national security because the deal allowed the TPLF and its fighters to survive. Eritrea sees an increasing alignment between Tigray and Addis Ababa and has maintained a military presence in Ethiopia as of early 2024.[14]

The summit is likely part of a framework that Egypt, Eritrea, and Somalia are developing to counter Ethiopia if it follows through on its port deal with Somaliland. Discussions before and during the summit referenced Somalia’s territorial integrity and sovereignty several times. The Somali and Eritrean presidents held a separate meeting before the summit on the need to bolster cooperation to maintain “the sovereignty, territorial integrity, independence, and unity of Somalia,” according to the Eritrean information ministry.[15] The Egyptian, Eritrean, and Somali presidents similarly stressed “the need to respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all countries in the region” in a joint statement.[16] This rhetoric mimics Somalia’s repeated rejection of the port deal as a violation of its sovereignty.[17]

Egypt and Somalia have made previous warnings about the port deal and postured against Ethiopia militarily. The UK-based outlet al Araby al Jadid reported in September 2024 that Ethiopia sent a backchannel message to Egypt via Djibouti that “any Egyptian military forces that harm Addis Ababa’s interests in Somalia will not be immune from dealing with them.”[18] Egypt reportedly responded that “it is ready to escalate and respond forcefully to any attempt to harm the Egyptian presence in Somalia or Somali interests, in implementation of the military protocol signed with Mogadishu.”[19]

The recent increase in Egyptian-Somali military cooperation is meant to combat al Shabaab while threatening Ethiopia. Egypt’s foreign ministry spokesperson said in late September that its arms shipments aimed to support Somalia to “combat terrorism and preserve its sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity.”[20] The latter objective suggests the shipment is at least in part to counter Ethiopia’s port deal with Somaliland.[21] CTP previously noted that some of the arms Egypt has sent, particularly heavy weaponry such as anti-tank and antiaircraft artillery, are meant for use against Ethiopia, as al Shabaab lacks the capabilities to warrant such weaponry.[22] The Somali foreign minister also threatened in September to establish contact with insurgents in Ethiopia if Ethiopia followed through on its port deal with Somaliland.[23]

Figure 2. Ethiopia-Somalia Dispute: 2024 Timeline

Source: Liam Karr.

Egypt, Somalia, and Eritrea seek to legitimize their alliance against Ethiopia and build up Somalia’s military in the short term. Eritrea and Somalia “commended” an Egyptian proposal from August 2024 to contribute to the multilateral African Union peacekeeping mission in Somalia after the current mission ends in December 2024. The statement shows unity between the three countries on the proposal as Uganda and other troop-contributing countries voiced concerns with the proposal in recent months.[24] Egypt’s proposal is aimed at undermining Ethiopia by enabling Somalia to follow through on its threat to expel the thousands of Ethiopian forces in Somalia and deploy Egyptian forces in a country bordering Ethiopia.[25] The three presidents also said that the Somalia National Army “will be empowered to effectively combat terrorism in all forms,” which includes “protecting Somalia’s land and maritime borders.”[26] The statement suggests that Egypt and Eritrea will provide further military support to Somalia.

Egypt, Eritrea, and Somalia aim to align their policies in the long term, which will likely include policies on Ethiopia. The three countries agreed during the summit to establish a trilateral joint committee with the foreign ministers from each country to “oversee and advance strategic cooperation across all areas.”[27] The creation of the committee suggests that foreign ministers from Egypt, Eritrea, and Somalia will have ongoing meetings to coordinate and legitimize their foreign policies. These policies likely will include measures to counter Ethiopia as all three countries share concerns about Ethiopia. This creates opportunities for Egypt and Eritrea to isolate and pressure Ethiopia on the GERD and destroy militias in Ethiopia that Eritrea views as a threat.

Ethiopia:

The head of the TPLF removed the head of the Tigray interim administration on October 7, signaling a worsening legitimacy crisis in the Tigray region. The TPLF is an ethno-nationalist paramilitary group and political party that primarily operates in the northern Tigray region in Ethiopia and fought against the Ethiopian government in a civil war from 2020 to 2022.[28] The federal government signed a peace treaty with the TPLF in 2022.[29] The peace treaty included a cessation of hostilities, resumption of humanitarian aid, the disarmament of the TPLF, and recognition of the Ethiopian military as the only defense force.[30] Abiy created the interim administration in March 2023 and selected Getachew Reda, the former deputy of the TPLF, as its leader as part of a 2022 peace agreement that ended the two-year Tigray war.

Disputes over the legitimacy of the TPLF and interim administration between Debretsion Gebremichael, who is the head of the TPLF, and Reda began in October 2023 when Reda dismissed several members of the TPLF for attempting to attend a TPLF meeting.[31] The disputes escalated when Ethiopia’s election board denied the TPLF’s request to be fully reinstated as a political party in August 2024.[32] Gebremichael has accused the interim administration of corruption, attempting to command Tigray security forces, and positioning itself as a permanent government. Reda called Gebremichael’s recent dismissal of Reda from the interim administration a “coup.” Reda and Gebremichael have said they will take legal action and consult with the federal government to remove each other from their posts, respectively.[33]

Figure 3. Tigray Conflict: 2022–24 Timeline

Source: Kathryn Tyson.

The legitimacy crisis between the TPLF and the interim government is another challenge in implementing the 2022 Pretoria peace agreement, which ended the Tigray war. The standoff and constant reshuffling of interim administration officials inhibit the interim administration from carrying out its roles under the peace agreement, including providing governance and improving humanitarian conditions.

The interim and federal governments had already struggled to implement several key aspects of the 2022 peace agreement. The peace deal stipulates that all non-Tigray forces withdraw from the Tigray region. Eritrean forces, which fought against the TPLF alongside the Ethiopian military, remain in several areas in the Tigray region as of early 2024.[34] Amhara authorities and supporting militias that supported the federal government are also in de facto control of disputed territory along the Amhara and Tigray regional borders, and Amhara and Tigray forces continue to clash in these[35] The agreement further stipulates that internally displaced persons are reintegrated into Ethiopian society, but the external forces have prevented internally displaced persons from returning to their homes[36] The Tigray Defense Forces have also largely not disarmed and remain mobilized and unintegrated despite disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration clause in the peace deal.[37]

Figure 4. Ethno-Nationalist Militia Area of Operations in Northern Ethiopia

Source: Liam Karr.

The standoff could end the peace deal, which would prompt the resumption of violence between the TPLF and Ethiopian government. There are no public negotiations between the TPLF, interim government, and federal government to resolve the disputes. Abiy reportedly held talks with Gebremichael on October 10, but Ethiopian media did not report any breakthroughs.[38] The TPLF and interim government also disagree on the core principles of the peace agreement. The TPLF believes that the interim government and its faction are responsible for signing the peace agreement.[39] The TPLF claims the agreement is designed to dismantle the TPLF as the TPLF attempts to regain the political status that it held before the Tigray war.[40] The interim government denies the TPLF claim and insists the peace agreement is an international pact that should be honored.[41] The Abiy government’s failure to implement the 2022 peace agreement risks a return to violence. Tigray forces are demobilized but not disarmed, and the Tigray forces and interim government have warned about the threat of violence.[42]

[1] https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cdje7pkv1zxo; https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/10/10/somalia-eritera-and-egypt-pledge-to-bloster-security-ties; https://www.barrons.com/news/leaders-of-egypt-eritrea-somalia-meet-amid-regional-tensions-7eccc9a9

[2] https://x.com/SONNALIVE/status/1844705225388544235; https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cdje7pkv1zxo

[3] https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-67911057

[4] https://www.reuters.com/markets/somalia-president-signs-law-nullifying-ethiopia-somaliland-port-deal-2024-01-07; https://www.voanews.com/a/tensions-escalate-between-somalia-ethiopian-over-au-summit-incident-/7494152.html; https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-67911057

[5]  https://www.dailynewsegypt dot com/2024/01/08/somalias-president-visits-eritrea-as-horn-of-africa-tensions-rise-over-ethiopias-sea-access-quest/

[6] https://www.hiiraan dot com/news4/2024/Jan/194521/somaliland_s_military_meets_ethiopian_counterparts_fuelling_regional_dispute_over_port_deal.aspx

[7] https://x.com/HarunMaruf/status/1823760457955488248; https://x.com/TheVillaSomalia/status/1823717687563784576; https://papsrepository.africa-union.org/handle/123456789/2143; https://x.com/GaroweOnline/status/1823777711698919846

[8] https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/egypt-sends-arms-somalia-following-security-pact-sources-say-2024-08-28; https://www.thenationalnews dot com/news/mena/2024/08/29/ethiopia-alarmed-as-egypt-sends-special-forces-and-arms-to-somalia; https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cglk038p1d3o

[9] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/africa-file-special-edition-external-meddling-for-the-red-sea-exacerbates-conflicts-in-the-horn-of-africa

[10] https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-67332811

[11] https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-controversy-over-the-grand-ethiopian-renaissance-dam

[12] https://www.state.gov/secretary-antony-j-blinken-and-egyptian-foreign-minister-badr-abdelatty-at-a-joint-press-availability; https://www.aljazeera dot com/economy/2020/6/30/egypt-warns-of-existential-threat-from-ethiopia-dam; https://www.sis.gov dot eg/Story/189557/Ethiopia%E2%80%99s-unilateral-GERD-operation-an-%E2%80%98existential-threat%E2%80%99-to-all-Egyptians-Irrigation-ministers; https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-controversy-over-the-grand-ethiopian-renaissance-dam; https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/africaatlse/2024/02/28/the-grand-ethiopian-renaissance-dam-and-its-discontents; https://natoassociation.ca/the-ethiopian-dam-and-its-impact-on-egypt-and-sudan; https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/nile-basins-gerd-dispute-creates-risks-for-egypt-sudan-and-beyond

[13] https://horninstitute.org/the-tigray-conflict-and-the-role-of-eritrea; https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/eritrea-ethiopia/eritreas-long-bitter-feud-ethiopias-tigray

[14] https://www.usip.org/publications/2023/12/taking-ethiopia-eritrea-tensions-seriously; https://apnews.com/article/ethiopia-tigray-eritrean-troops-abducting-farmers-livestock-bd11f55a42b4705a2da5c01afbd7cc74

[15] https://www.barrons.com/articles/leaders-of-egypt-eritrea-somalia-meet-amid-regional-tensions-7eccc9a9

[16] https://x.com/SONNALIVE/status/1844705225388544235

[17] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/salafi-jihadi-movement-update-special-edition-ethiopia-somaliland-port-deal-alters-horn

[18] https://www.alaraby.co.uk/politics/%D8%B1%D8%B3%D8%A7%D8%A6%D9%84-%D8%AA%D8%AD%D8%B0%D9%8A%D8%B1-%D8%B9%D8%B3%D9%83%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%85%D8%AA%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%AF%D9%84%D8%A9-%D8%A8%D9%8A%D9%86-%D9%85%D8%B5%D8%B1-%D9%88%D8%A5%D8%AB%D9%8A%D9%88%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%A7-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B5%D9%88%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%84

[19] https://www.alaraby.co.uk/politics/%D8%B1%D8%B3%D8%A7%D8%A6%D9%84-%D8%AA%D8%AD%D8%B0%D9%8A%D8%B1-%D8%B9%D8%B3%D9%83%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%85%D8%AA%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%AF%D9%84%D8%A9-%D8%A8%D9%8A%D9%86-%D9%85%D8%B5%D8%B1-%D9%88%D8%A5%D8%AB%D9%8A%D9%88%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%A7-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B5%D9%88%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%84

[20] https://www.facebook.com/share/DzKykKsr3ZM9MUiU/?mibextid=WC7FNe

[21] https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/jan/02/somalia-defend-sovereignty-ethiopia-somaliland-deal-port; https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-67861390

[22] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/africa-file-september-5-2024-egypt-ethiopia-and-somalia-conflict-looms-is-gains-in-niger-russia-aids-burkina-fasos-nuclear-energy-push#Horn; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/africa-file-september-26-2024-fano-offensive-in-ethiopias-amhara-egypt-arms-somalia-rebel-drones-in-mali-burkina-thwarts-another-coup#Somalia

[23] https://www.voanews.com/a/somalia-open-to-supporting-ethiopia-rebels/7784531.html

[24] https://www.garoweonline dot com/en/news/somalia/uganda-opposes-egypt-s-troop-deployment-to-somalia; https://www-theeastafrican-co-ke.webpkgcache dot com/doc/-/s/www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/donors-troop-contributors-in-jitters-over-egypt-s-new-role-4786854

[25] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/africa-file-october-10-2024-aussom-challenges-fano-counteroffensive-drc-attacks-fdlr-malis-northern-challenges-togo-border-pressure#Somalia

[26] https://x.com/SONNALIVE/status/1844705225388544235

[27] https://x.com/SONNALIVE/status/1844705225388544235

[28] https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/conflict-ethiopia

[29] https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/conflict-ethiopia

[30] https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/key-points-ethiopias-ceasefire-agreement-2022-11-04/

[31] https://epo.acleddata.com/2023/11/01/epo-weekly-21-27-october-2023/

[32] https://epo.acleddata.com/2024/08/15/ethiopia-weekly-update-13-august-2024/

[33] https://x.com/reda_getachew/status/1843388522637430878; https://allafrica.com/stories/202410070572.html

[34] https://apnews.com/article/ethiopia-tigray-eritrean-troops-abducting-farmers-livestock-bd11f55a42b4705a2da5c01afbd7cc74

[35] https://epo.acleddata.com/2024/07/05/ethiopia-monthly-update-june-2024-the-pursuit-of-peace-in-amhara-region/

[36] https://epo.acleddata.com/tigray/#:~:text=Tigray%20region%20faces%20food%20shortages,zone%2Dlevel%20reshuffles%20in%20leadership.; https://addisstandard.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/AU-led-Ethiopia-Peace-Agreement.pdf; https://apnews.com/article/ethiopia-tigray-eritrean-troops-abducting-farmers-livestock-bd11f55a42b4705a2da5c01afbd7cc74; https://addisstandard.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/AU-led-Ethiopia-Peace-Agreement.pdf

[37] https://x.com/reda_getachew/status/1612928216192192514; https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/1/11/ethiopias-tigray-rebels-start-handing-over-heavy-weapons; https://epo.acleddata.com/2024/03/19/epo-monthly-update-february-2024-clashes-in-tigrays-disputed-territories-threaten-peace-deal/

[38] https://borkena dot com/2024/10/10/debretsion-meeting-with-abiy-ahmed-bear-no-fruit/

[39] https://epo.acleddata.com/2024/09/25/ethiopia-weekly-update-24-september-2024/

[40] https://epo.acleddata.com/2024/09/25/ethiopia-weekly-update-24-september-2024/

[41] https://epo.acleddata.com/2024/09/25/ethiopia-weekly-update-24-september-2024/

[42] https://www.facebook.com/addismaleda/posts/pfbid0WKqj7nFEbwbnernyoV9z2cq5T4fszyT1ZtJTFuvVcqScMYMQtu9UvVrwBifqXdw8l; https://www.bbc.com/amharic/articles/c8xlg784q8xo?fbclid=IwY2xjawEyaAtleHRuA2FlbQIxMAABHTSmryR1y4dW5s7gJfZgoAsQHxAkcT03y53pVTUlyC70CcHtbjojSPrkXQ_aem_u73JPzy7zNCuT8dSUs2pSA; https://epo.acleddata.com/2024/08/21/ethiopia-weekly-update-20-august-2024/