Ethiopia’s recent rhetoric surrounding the annexation of Eritrea’s coastline should raise alarm bells for anyone watching the Horn of Africa. The echoes of Haile Selassie’s imperial ambitions, particularly his forced annexation of Eritrea, are unmistakable. Now, under the regime of Abiy Ahmed, those ambitions are being resurrected. This is not mere nationalistic bluster; Ethiopia and Eritrea are on a collision course, and the prospect of renewed conflict grows by the day.
Abiy, despite posturing as a reformist, is a brute authoritarian backed into a corner. Ethiopia’s ethno-political divisions, which have festered for decades and become entrenched in the country’s social fabric, are no longer just political headaches; they are existential threats to his rule. Ethiopia has never been a unified country historically, Abyssinia and precedingly Ethiopia was always a country divided along ethnic lines. The claim that Ethiopia became ethnically divided in the past three decades due to ethnic federalism is a deliberate piece of propaganda, aimed at shifting the blame for the current ethnic fragmentation onto the regime that preceded the regime of Abiy Ahmed. Meles Zenawi, the former autocratic leader of Ethiopia, fundamentally reshaped the nation’s political landscape by instituting a system of regional federalism based on ethnic lines. This strategy sought to balance power dynamics among Ethiopia’s diverse ethnic groups within a country historically fragmented along ethnic and linguistic lines. Ethiopia has always been deeply ethnically divided, long before the advent of ethnic federalism.
In this context, a war with Eritrea is more than just a regional flashpoint; it is a potential lifeline for Abiy to consolidate power, neutralize internal dissent, and redirect national insecurity outward. This war is something Abiy needs more than Isaias Afewerki. For Abiy, conflict serves as a rallying cry, an opportunity to manufacture unity in a country unraveling under ethnic violence and fragmentation. His own Oromo base is growing increasingly disillusioned, and his reliance on nationalist factions signals desperation rather than strategy. With pressure mounting from all sides, the prospect of war offers Abiy an escape hatch, a means to silence opposition and tighten his grip.
Abiy’s flirtation with Ethiopian irredentism is not about imperial restoration; it is about political survival. His rhetoric on reclaiming Eritrea’s Red Sea access masks a deeper reality: his government lacks legitimacy, and his hold on power is maintained solely through a monopoly on violence in Addis Ababa. His alignment with Ethiopian ultranationalists underscores his precarious position. War would provide a pretext to suppress internal threats from the FANO, a decentralized Amhara rebel force, and the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA), all under the guise of national security. Yet this gamble is fraught with peril. Ethiopia is not a military hegemon in the Horn of Africa; its forces are stretched thin, bogged down in Tigray, Oromia, Amhara, and Ogaden, and riddled with factionalism. Opening a new front against Eritrea would not project strength; it would expose desperation.
For the Horn of Africa, the stakes could not be higher. A war between Ethiopia and Eritrea would ignite a regional firestorm, further destabilizing an already volatile landscape. Sudan has been locked in civil war since the fall of Omar al-Bashir, descending into chaos worse than Libya and teetering on the brink of becoming another Somalia. The conflict has already claimed over 150,000 lives and displaced more than 10 million people. South Sudan, meanwhile, is on the verge of renewed civil war, its fragile peace unraveling. Ethiopia’s ethnic fragmentation and deepening fault lines increasingly mirror the Balkanization of Yugoslavia, as violence escalates in Amhara, Tigray, Oromia, and Ogaden. Somalia, engulfed in civil war for over three decades, faces a resurgent al-Shabaab, threatening to upend fragile security gains. Amid this turmoil, Eritrea stands as an isolated stronghold, a rigid dictatorship reminiscent of Enver Hoxha’s Albania, stable on the surface but surrounded by an inferno of instability.
Eritrea, for all its autocratic rigidity, has little interest in direct confrontation. But if pushed, it will respond with force. The consequences would be far-reaching, drawing in regional and international actors, exacerbating existing conflicts, and plunging the region into deeper chaos. The international community cannot afford to dismiss this as mere posturing. Diplomatic engagement is critical to averting a catastrophe, but whether Ethiopia’s internal ethnic fractures can be managed without war remains an open question. What is clear, however, is that Abiy is willing to take extreme risks to maintain power, and Eritrea will be the second to pay the price, following Abiy Ahmed’s regime’s siege of the Tigray region.
The Calculus of Deception and Conflict: Abiy and Afwerki’s Path to War
The Tigray War was not a spontaneous outbreak of violence; it was a calculated, premeditated conflict orchestrated by the Ethiopian and Eritrean regimes, and Amhara forces to eliminate the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) as a political and military threat. The war was waged from two fronts: to the north, the Eritrean Defense Forces (EDF) under Isaias Afewerki’s regime, and to the south, Abiy Ahmed’s Ethiopian National Defense Force (ENDF) in Addis Ababa. This was a marriage of convenience, two authoritarian leaders with a shared enemy, the TPLF, whose elimination served their mutual interests. The outcome was not only devastating for the Tigray region but also served the geopolitical ambitions and regime survival of both Abiy and Afewerki.
The Tigray War stands as one of the most catastrophic conflicts in modern African history, claiming an estimated 600,000 lives, displacing millions, and devastating an entire region. Yet, it was largely ignored by African news outlets and the international community. Abiy Ahmed’s regime orchestrated a punitive siege on Tigray, cutting off food, medical supplies, fuel, electricity, and international humanitarian aid to impose a deliberate neutralization of the local population. The deliberate use of siege and starvation as weapons by Abiy Ahmed mirrored the brutal tactics of Haile Selassie, who systematically suppressed famine to crush the region’s resistance, In doing so, Abiy Ahmed and the ENDF committed genocide in Tigray. Despite the immense human toll, the war ultimately served as a strategic victory for Abiy Ahmed and Isaias Afewerki. It was never just about the TPLF; it was about ensuring the survival of their respective regimes. For the people of Tigray, lasting peace and prosperity can only be realized through self-determination, ultimately culminating in full independence and the establishment of the Republic of Tigray, where they can live free from persecution by the Ethiopian state.
The Pretoria peace agreement deal, signed hastily in late 2022, marked the conclusion phase of the siege of Tigray but did little to resolve the underlying political and military insecurity or the strategic objectives that had driven Abiy and Afewerki into war. For Abiy Ahmed, the war left the Tigray Defense Forces (TDF) severely weakened but still a potent threat on Eritrea’s southern doorstep. The peace deal did not neutralize the TDF; instead, it left them wounded but vengeful. The TDF, whose primary objective was the overthrow of Abiy’s regime, found itself pinned to a border, humiliated and desperate for retribution. Abiy used this opportunity to consolidate his control with the help of Eritrean manpower, capital, and military hardware, securing his regime while simultaneously deepening the animosity between the Tigrayan people and the Eritrean people, two groups who share a common ethnic and linguistic heritage.
Abiy’s survival hinged on two crucial objectives: first, to ensure that the Tigray region could never again become a political or military power center challenging his rule; and second, to avoid the revival of the kind of military alliance between Eritreans and Tigrayans that had once brought down Mengistu Haile Mariam’s Communist regime in the 1990s. The war allowed Abiy to achieve both, ensuring that no viable political opposition would emerge from Tigray, while also solidifying his position as the dominant power broker in Ethiopia.
For Isaias Afewerki, the war in Tigray was more personal. While the Eritrean regime’s stated objective was to eliminate the TPLF’s military influence, the true purpose was to ensure that no Eritrean political party in exile could challenge his decades-long autocratic rule. The war was an opportunity to extinguish the notion of an Eritrean-Tigrayan alliance by perpetuating a narrative that conflated the Eritrean people with Afewerki’s regime. In doing so, Afewerki could coup-proof his dictatorship by breeding a deep and lasting animosity between the Tigray and Eritrean populations, ensuring that any future cooperation between them would be unthinkable. For Afewerki, the deal with Abiy was a tactical concession, a recognition that the TDF was not to be annihilated but rather left in a state of perpetual weakness. The peace deal ensured that the Tigrayans would never be able to present a unified front with the Eritrean people against his rule. A nervous, fractured, and hyper-vigilant Tigray was more useful as a deterrent on the border than a unified, vengeful force threatening his power.
A Strategic Gamble for Regime Survival and Geopolitical Maneuvering
The crimes committed during the Tigray War, widespread displacement, and systematic atrocities were facilitated by both Abiy’s and Afewerki’s regimes. Those responsible for these heinous acts reside in Addis Ababa and Asmara. Abiy’s regime invited the Afewerki to participate, turning what could have been a purely internal Ethiopian conflict into a regional war. Eritrean soldiers were responsible for much of the heavy lifting during the war. Without the participation of the Eritrean Defense Forces, the TDF would have likely captured Addis Ababa and overthrown Abiy Ahmed, relegating him to the same fate as Mengistu, forced into exile.
Eritrea’s involvement in the war was not a matter of national interest but rather a personal investment for Afewerki’s regime. The war was a strategic blunder, one that sacrificed Eritrea’s sovereignty for the sake of prolonging Afewerki’s grip on power. In the eyes of many Eritreans, this war raised an important question: Is Isaias Afewerki a true Eritrean nationalist or an Ethiopianist at heart? Afewerki’s actions suggest the latter. In the last 33 years, Afewerki has managed only to consolidate his dictatorship, leaving Eritrea economically, politically, and socially hollowed out. The country, once proud of its hard-won independence, now finds itself a shadow of its former self, a nation slowly dying under the weight of Afewerki’s regime.
When Afewerki embraced Abiy and declared “
” (“we did not lose anything”) in Tigrigna, he made it clear that his regime had secured its survival. But what of the Eritrean families who had lost loved ones during the 1998 Badme War? What of the citizens who still wait for the implementation of the Eritrean constitution, the promise of free elections, and the end of indefinite military service? Did they “lose nothing”? Afewerki’s proclamation struck a bitter chord with many who had paid the ultimate price for Eritrean independence and the families of those who lost their loved ones during the Badme War.The Path to Ending the Eritrean Dictatorship
The solution to Eritrea’s dictatorship will most likely come from within the very ranks of the military. Junior officers, those not yet entrenched in the power structure, will be the ones to rise up and take the ultimate risk. Senior officers are already compromised, preferring the status quo that enriches them while the nation suffers. As for the so-called Eritrean opposition groups like Brigade Nhamedu (Blue Revolution), their silence in the face of Abiy’s territorial ambitions raises questions about their true loyalties. Are they genuinely working in the interests of the Eritrean people, or are they pawns of Abiy’s regime, pushing for an Ethiopian expansionist agenda at the expense of Eritrean sovereignty? One thing is certain: A political party or military junta established in Ethiopia, will never have the consent of the Eritrean people.
For the Horn of Africa, the stakes couldn’t be higher. A war between Ethiopia and Eritrea would further destabilize an already volatile region. It would allow Abiy’s regime to leverage populist nationalism to cover up its internal failures. The international community must take note; this is a moment where diplomatic engagement is essential to prevent a catastrophic conflict. But whether Ethiopia’s ethnic tensions can be addressed without war remains to be seen. What is clear is that Abiy’s regime is willing to take extreme risks to maintain power, and Eritrea may pay the price.
Abiy Ahmed and Isaias Afewerki have shown that they are willing to take extreme risks to maintain power, risks that may come at the expense of Eritrea itself. Their genocidal actions in Tigray have shown that no one, not even Eritrea, is beyond their reach. The question remains: If Abiy was willing to wage a genocidal war against his own “fellow Ethiopians” in the Tigray region, what does he have in store for the people of Eritrea?
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are solely those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the United States Army, the Department of Defense, or any other agency of the U.S. government.
Ethiopia’s recent rhetoric surrounding the annexation of Eritrea’s coastline should raise alarm bells for anyone watching the Horn of Africa.
